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The United Nations￿Human Development Index (HDI) takes several dimen-
sions ￿ income, school enrolment and literacy rate, longevity￿ and com-
bines them into a single ￿gure that measures the degree of development of
a given country. However, there is disagreement about (i) how to normalize
the scores for the di⁄erent criteria to make them comparable and (ii) how
to aggregate the (normalized) scores over the di⁄erent criteria. At the risk
of stressing the obvious, changes in normalization and/or aggregation will
a⁄ect the country rankings. First, we focus on robust rankings, i.e., rankings
which hold for a wide set of normalization and/or aggregation procedures.
Second, we show that all proposed ranking procedures can be implemented
via linear programming techniques. Third, we illustrate how our methodol-
ogy can prove useful in assessing the robustness of the human development
country ranking/classi￿cation (produced annually by the United Nations)
in a descriptive and statistical way.
JEL-codes: C61, D63, I31, O10.
Keywords: Human Development Index, Lorenz Dominance, Linear pro-
gramming, Robustness Analysis.￿It is better to be vaguely right, than precisely wrong￿ (Wildon Carr)
1 Introduction
Gauging human development is a much needed, yet very challenging and
intricate enterprise. The epitome of this endeavour is the series of Human
Development Reports (HDR) commissioned by the United Nations Devel-
opment Programme (UNDP) since 1990. Ever since their inception, these
reports have stressed that human development can not be assessed by look-
ing at income alone, e.g., by analyzing the evolution of a country￿ s GDP
per capita over time. Upholding the view that ￿ people are the real wealth of
nations￿(HDR 2004, p. 217), this measure can indeed hardly be regarded as
an end in itself. Heavily in￿ uenced by the work of Amartya Sen, the HDR￿ s
have instead continuously endorsed and promoted the idea that people￿ s
￿ capabilities￿are the prime objectives of human development. Speci￿cally,
this means that human development ought to be regarded as a process of
expanding peoples￿choices, i.e., of taking away obstacles to the things a per-
son could do and be in his life. Thus income continues to be an important
yardstick ￿ since it is indicative of a person￿ s ￿command over resources￿
(Anand and Sen, 2000)￿ but has been complemented by numerous other
indicators. In fact, the typical HDR is composed of dozens of tables and
￿gures, reporting on hundreds of indicators that are all related in some way
or another to the overarching concept of human development.
Unfortunately, a plethora of statistics is ill-suited as a tool for public
communication. Grabbing the attention of various stakeholders and trigger-
ing public debate are major reasons for the fact that, since the beginning, the
reports have also provided a summary ￿ Human Development Index￿(HDI).
This index singles out (a) leading a long and healthy life, (b) being knowl-
edgeable, and (c) enjoying a decent standard of living as three key aspects
of human development. The index surely succeeds in attracting public in-
terest to the HDR￿ s, as witnessed by the media coverage that accompanies
the release of a new HDR. In point of fact, the media headlines quite often
relate to the country ranking that results from the HDI.
Evidently, by its very nature a summary index is bound to conceal im-
portant aspects of a complex phenomenon such as human development. The
HDI￿ s authors are actually the ￿rst to stress that the index is by no means
a complete measure of a country￿ s level of development.1 In fact, the au-
1As a matter of fact, this statement can be found as such on
hdr.undp.org/statistics/faq/.
1thors have always been very meticulous in spelling out their methodology,
in making the underlying data accessible, and in fostering the transparency
of the HDI￿ s construction by including interactive DIY-versions on their of-
￿cial website (hdr.undp.org/statistics/indices). As a result, we will not give
a detailed explanation of its construction here. It will su¢ ce to point here
at the three steps that lead up to the HDI. First, each of the three aforemen-
tioned aspects is associated with particular quantitative indicators (viz. life
expectancy at birth; adult literacy rate and the school enrolment ratio; GDP
per capita as measured in PPP US$). In their original form these individual
indicators are incommensurable. Therefore, in a second step, the original
data are normalized, i.e., re-expressed on a scale from 0 to 1. Once this has
been accomplished, the normalized variables are aggregated via an (equally)
weighted sum. Even this briefest of accounts illustrates that the HDI indeed
errs on the side of simplicity: methodological transparency and substantive
precision are not exactly synonymous.2
Now, precisely in view of the fact that the HDI is scrupulously presented
as only a part of the overall picture, attacking its method of construction
seems like rather an easy criticism. It may lead one to wonder why so
many researchers make every e⁄ort to analyze, criticize and try to improve
that construction methodology. We think at least two reasons can be given.
First, the HDR￿ s authors have proven to be receptive to such criticisms; its
construction has been slightly modi￿ed over the years and these modi￿ca-
tions have at least partially been inspired by critical annotations from the
scienti￿c community (see, e.g., Fukada-Parr, 2001; Fukada-Parr and Shiva
Kumar, 2003). Second, and more importantly, precisely because the HDI
has such a high media pro￿le, it seems to have acquired a similarly eye-
catching ￿ test case￿ -position in the broader debate on whether and how a
multi-dimensional phenomenon, which builds on di⁄erent and often incom-
mensurable primary components, ought to be summarized in a composite
indicator.
Booysen (2002, p. 131) summarizes the debate on composite indicators
by noting that ￿not one single element of composite indexing is above crit-
icism.￿And indeed, the HDI is a well-known case in point. Some authors
have proposed the inclusion of other indicators in the index (e.g., Sagar and
Najam, 1998; Dar, 2004), while others have suggested indicators with a spe-
2Evidently, we fully agree with the view that full accessibility to both the basic data
and the speci￿c construction methodology are good qualities: they can only enhance
the credibility of a composite indicator. For similar remarks, see the OECD-European
Commission￿ s Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators (Nardo et al., 2005).
2ci￿c focus (such as poverty or gender; e.g., Klasen and Bardhan, 1999). As
regards the pure measurement aspects, several writers have forwarded dif-
ferent alternatives to the speci￿c, ￿ arbitrary￿normalization procedures used
by UNDP (e.g., Luchters and Menkho⁄, 2000; Panigrahi and Sivramkrishna,
2002; Mazumdar, 2003; Chakravarty, 2003), whereas others have primarily
focused on the method of aggregating/weighting the di⁄erent components
(e.g., Noorbakhsh, 1988; Sagar and Najam, 1998; Mahlberg and Obersteiner,
2001; Dowrick et al., 2003; Lind, 2004; Despotis, 2005; Chatterjee, 2005).
Again, many of the aforementioned authors particularly emphasize the ef-
fects of changes in this procedure on the resulting country ranking.
In this paper, we will also be concerned with the pure normalization/aggregation
aspects and their e⁄ects on eventual country rankings. We will hence take
the original quantitative indicators as given, and will sidestep the contro-
versy over whether these are e⁄ectively suited to capture all fundamental,
universally shared and measurable dimensions of human development. Al-
though we will propose a di⁄erent normalization procedure than the one
that is actually used, our primary purpose is not to add yet another re-
measured HDI to an already impressive list of variants. Instead, we present
on the following pages a methodology that intends precisely to capture the
fact that there is wide disagreement about the normalization and aggrega-
tion of the HDI￿ s components. In a speci￿c sense, such disagreement can
even be taken as a de￿ning characteristic of this general type of composite
indicator: one does agree that there is a complex multi-faceted issue such
as, in this case, human development, and one does acknowledge that many
sub-indicators, related to this overarching concept, can be discerned. But
the exact (inter)relationship between these sub-indicators and that ￿ vague￿
global phenomenon is too di¢ cult to grasp exactly; hence the real possibility
of dispute, even among experts.
We will start in section 2 by taking each of these two well-known origins
of dispute in turn. We start with the aggregation issue. In section 2.1, we
propose the aggregation of (normalized) scores using the class of increas-
ing and S-concave indices. Thus, our multi-dimensional ranking criterion
is equivalent to the idea of generalized Lorenz dominance. Proceeding as
such, we seek to give foundation to the concern that it may not solely be the
average, but also the distribution of the (normalized) scores in the di⁄erent
dimensions that must be taken into account when comparing countries.3 In
3Maassoumi and Nickelsburg (1988, p. 328) were among the ￿rst to point out that
￿without this diversity in distributions there would be no need for a multi-dimensional
measure.￿We stress that the diversity pertains to the ￿ inequality￿among indicators and
3section 2.2, we adddress the normalization issue. Speci￿cally, we propose a
way to summarize con￿ icts of opinion that pertain to the question whether
and how, e.g., a relatively high level of life expectancy outweighs a com-
paratively low literacy rate. Essentially, we allow for ￿ zones of agreement￿
(resp. ￿ zones of disagreement￿ ) in which there is consensus (resp. no con-
sensus) among experts that a score in one dimension outweighs a score in
another dimension. Next, in section 3, we look at alternative methods of
progressing from individual opinions to an aggregate decision rule. In par-
ticular, we suggest (i) a strong dominance criterion: country x is at least as
good as y according to all (mutually agreed) normalization schemes and all
increasing S-concave indices, and (ii) a weak dominance criterion: country x
is at least as good as y if there exists at least one normalization scheme within
the mutually agreed set of possible schemes that results in x outperforming
y (on the basis of all increasing S-concave indices), while no other normaliza-
tion scheme leads to the opposite result. In particular, the core of our paper
is concerned with identifying workable rules for the implementation of both
decision criteria. Speci￿cally, we demonstrate how these criteria translate
into linear programming problems. By the very nature of these two criteria,
it is evident that in several cases one may end up with incomplete rankings.
But what is gained is precisely the increased robustness of the comparisons
that still can be made. That is, even if the scienti￿c community establishes
only a limited consensus on how to gauge human development, the tools to
be presented can still be useful to answer the question whether one country
indeed ￿ outperforms￿another one (or itself, if one uses time series data). In
section 4 we look at the results of such exercises, using the 2002 UN dataset,
and illustrate the usefulness of our methodology for investigating (statisti-
cally as well as descriptively) the robustness of the United Nations￿human
development ranking. A ￿nal section 5 concludes.
not about inter-individual inequality, e.g., of income. The same issue has been taken up
recently by Chatterjee (2005).
42 Notation
A country is characterized by a score vector x = (x1;:::;xj;:::;xn) 2 Rn
++,
containing one score in each ￿ human development￿ -increasing dimension j 2
J = f1;:::;ng.4 There is disagreement about (i) which benchmark to use
in each of the dimensions to normalize scores, and (ii) how to aggregate
the resulting normalized scores. Because it is necessary to understand the
aggregation procedure in order to understand the implications of the nor-
malization procedure, we take the former issue ￿rst.
2.1 Aggregation
We brie￿ y explain the method of aggregation for a (normalized) score vec-
tor s = (s1;:::;sn). To aggregate (normalized) scores, one typically uses
an index, which maps (normalized) score vectors into a comparable num-
ber, representing the level of human development in the di⁄erent countries,
formally, I : Rn
++ ! R : s 7! I (s). There can be disagreement whether (i)
a country is better than another merely because the sum of its normalized
scores is the higher of the two, (ii) when two countries have the same to-
tal, a country with less dispersed values should be regarded as equal to a
country with more dispersed values, and so on. The issue of disagreement
here is, as we have stated in the introduction, whether and to what extent
the eventual index should be responsive to ￿ inequality￿among the (normal-
ized) components. To obtain a robust criterion, we will therefore focus on
all indices which are (i) increasing and (ii) S-concave,5 which we collect in
a set I = fI j I is increasing and S-concaveg. This family of indices is the
basis for generalized Lorenz dominance (also called second-order stochastic
dominance):
definition 1: s generalized Lorenz dominates s0 if and only if
(1) 8I 2 I : I (s) ￿ I
￿
s0￿








a permutation of s such that sh1i ￿ sh2i ￿ ::: ￿ shni. We get:
4Our methodology is su¢ ciently general to cope with (i) ￿ human development￿ -
decreasing dimensions, e.g., the number of suicides in a country, and (ii) negative scores
in some dimensions. In particular, such instances can be accomodated through straight-
forward modi￿cations of the normalization procedure presented in Section 2.2.
5An index I is S-concave if and only if I (Bs) ￿ I (s), with B a bistochastic matrix,
i.e., rows and columns sum up to 1 and all entries are positive.
5proposition 1: s generalized Lorenz dominates s
0
if and only if















For later purposes, we mention some properties of the generalized Lorenz
dominance criterion. It satis￿es increasingness (a higher (normalized) score
in each dimension improves human development) and anonymity (the names
of the dimensions do not matter, or, permuting the scores over dimensions
does not alter the level of human development). Both properties are com-
mon to all indices in I and therefore inherited by the generalized Lorenz
dominance criterion. Furthermore, the generalized Lorenz dominance crite-
rion also satis￿es ratio-scale invariance: dividing the (normalized) scores in
all dimensions by the same strictly positive scalar leaves the ranking of two
countries unchanged.
At this point, it should be emphasized that the ￿nal outcome of our
robustness tests will build on pairwise dominance comparisons rather than
on checking the robustness of a country￿ s ￿ index number￿ . As is evident
from the foregoing, this is precisely because we want to check a necessary
and su¢ cient dominance condition for a complete family of (increasing and
S-concave) indices.6
2.2 Normalization
The fundamental reason for choosing to normalize the HDI￿ s components
is the lack of a ￿ known scienti￿c relationship￿which would otherwise serve
to accommodate for such comparability problems between the dimensions
under consideration, rather than the fact that the components were origi-
nally measured in di⁄erent units (this point is also stressed by Ebert and
Welsch, 2004). Explicitly taking this position towards the normalization
problem is, admittedly, a rather nonstandard approach. The more usual ap-
proach is to present the same problem ￿ vertically￿ , i.e., dimension-wise: one
eventually gets rid of original measurement units by dividing each original
sub-indicator value by another parameter measured on the same scale, to ag-
gregate these pure numbers afterwards. In particular, the HDI￿ s speci￿c use
6Our approach thus di⁄ers from the robustness tests for composite indicators as dis-
cussed by Saisana et al. (2005). Essentialy, these authors consider combinations of dif-
ferent normalization and aggregation scenarios, and use Monte Carlo techniques to check
how a country￿ s index number changes conditional upon a change in the scenario. The
end-product of such an approach is that the original index number is complemented by a
con￿dence interval.
6of the a¢ ne transformation, based on exogenous maximum and minimum
goalposts for each of the original sub-indicators, highlights the benchmark-
ing quality of the normalization step within each dimension. That is: the
normalized scores are constructed in such a way as to tell the user how much
better or worse a country is, in a speci￿c dimension, as compared to some
dimension-speci￿c goalposts.
As stated in the introduction, there has already been considerable debate
about the most appropriate technique for this normalization. Should one use
exogenous goalposts, or the sample maxima and minima? Should one allow
for a concave transformation, expressing the idea that an increase in the
value of some sub-indicator is somehow better starting from a low level than
the same increase when starting from a high level (e.g., Chakravarty, 2003)?
Should this only be for GDP per capita, as is the case today? And, even if
so, should GDP per capita indeed be measured in logarithms to start with
(e.g. Anand and Sen, 2000)? Moreover, it has by now been documented by
several of the aforementioned authors that a change in goalposts, let alone a
more general change in the normalization method, may well lead to changes
in the eventual country rankings.
The last observation is telling, as it immediately reveals that the choices
taken in the preliminary normalization stage already add considerable ￿ hor-
izontal￿structure to the multi-dimensional comparison. Some authors (e.g.,
Panigrabi and Sivramkrishna, 2002; Lind, 2004) have speci￿cally empha-
sized that the HDI￿ s ￿ explicit￿ , seemingly straightforward (equal) weighting
scheme in fact conceals ￿ implicit￿assumptions about the trade-o⁄s between
the sub-components that originate from the normalization stage. The com-
plete normalization/aggregation problem is therefore more intricate than
one is often inclined to think. Accordingly, when spelling out our normal-
ization approach, we will pay special attention to clarifying its ￿ horizontal￿
implications.
Our main concern is with the fact that, for understandable reasons, there
are di⁄erences of opinion about the comparability problem: some would say
that the monetary value of 1 life year is at least x US$, others would name a
di⁄erent ￿gure, and still others would refrain from making such comparisons
altogether. We now develop a formal approach to this disagreement problem.
Our starting point is that such disagreement regarding the normalization is-
sue essentially boils down to di⁄erences in opinion regarding the appropriate
(dimension-speci￿c) benchmarks. Of course, this intra-dimensional disagree-
ment will carry over to the inter-dimensional comparibility issue, as we will
subsequently demonstrate.
7We will start from the thought experiment in which a set of possible
benchmarks is considered for each dimension. Speci￿cally, consider a ￿ per-
centile￿ p, with 0 ￿ p ￿ 1













j the p-th quantile of all scores in dimension j. Two
extreme cases emerge. First, p = 1
2 implies that everybody agrees to use
the median score (in each dimension) as the only acceptable benchmark (for
that dimension). The other extreme, i.e. choosing p = 0; entails that all
values in between the minimal and maximal score can be regarded as plau-
sible benchmarks. A benchmark vector is denoted by b = (b1;:::;bn), which
belongs to the bounded set Bp =
n




. Two points are worth
stressing regarding this set-up. First, while we model consensus by choosing
p = 1
2, i.e., in each dimension the median score serves as the benchmark,
it should be obvious that our methodology can also handle other choices of
commonly agreed benchmark. Second, we choose p to be the same in each
dimension mainly to facilitate the exposition, but -of course- one could also
use p values that are speci￿c for each dimension.
The next step completes the normalization stage: we ￿get rid of mea-
surement units￿by dividing each original score by the corresponding bench-
mark.7 Thus, each eligible benchmark vector b = (b1;:::;bn) transforms
the original score vector x = (x1;:::;xn) into a normalized score vector






. Yet, as we have stressed above, this stage
in fact entails more then just getting rid of measurement units. It is here
that original values are rendered commensurable, and so the implications of
our approach with regard to the inter-dimensional comparibility issue will
be spelled out in more detail.
Again, consider ￿rst the case of p = 1=2. This is the full agreement case,
as it implies that in each dimension the median value is commonly considered
as the appropriate benchmark value. In turn, this agreement carries over
to the way original values are transformed into normalized values. For
example, in the case of the sample of our own empirical application (see
section 4), a country with a life expectancy equal to 35 years, which is
50% of the sample￿ s median life expectancy, obtains a score of 0.5 in this
dimension, while a country with a GDP per capita equal to 10600 US$,
7Although we use a ratio scale transformation in this paper, it is worth noting that our
methodologoy can also cope with more general a¢ ne transformations. This could be useful
for applications with possibly negative scores. In such instances, empirical implementation
of our robust outranking criteria requires a rather straightforward modi￿cation of the
linear programming tests introduced in the next section.
8twice the median value in our sample, obtains a score of 2. Consider then
the class of indices we discussed in section 2.1. In view of the ratio-scale
invariance property of this class, the foregoing also implies agreement about
the latter achievement being four times higher than the former. Finally, and
importantly, consider what happens if both scores are obtained by the same
country and if we proceed to the aggregation stage. As all composite indices
in the set I are increasing and anonymous, everyone would in that case agree
that the achievement in GDP per capita must outweigh the achievement in
life expectancy.
In fact, the interdimensional comparibility issue can also be presented
di⁄erently. Because of ratio-scale invariance, one can also use one dimension,
say dimension n, as the numeraire and normalize the scores in dimension
j = 1;:::;n by multiplying them with b0:5
n =b0:5
j . In terms of our example,
and choosing GDP per capita as the numeraire, the number b0:5
n =b0:5
j is the
implicit price of dimension j, i.e., the value (in PPP US$ per capita) of 1
unit of dimension j. In our sample, e.g., we get a ￿gure of about 75 US$ per
person, per life year. As a consequence, an achievement in life expectancy
equal to x outweighs an achievement in GDP of y if and only if 75x is larger
than y.8
So far, we have focused on the extreme ￿ full agreement￿scenario. Fol-
lowing the above reasoning, other (and often more realistic) disagreement
scenarios can be captured by decreasing p. More speci￿cally, we select lower
values for p to introduce doubt about the exact implicit price of the di⁄erent
dimensions. For example, choosing p = 1
4 (the inter-quartile range), leads to







. For our sample, this means that the price of one life
year must then lie somewhere in [27;214]. As a consequence, there is no
longer full agreement regarding the exact trade-o⁄ between life expectancy
achievement and GDP performance.
8We should emphasize at this point that this ￿gure is the implicit trade-o⁄ as it results
from the (undoubtedly normative) normalization options taken by the analyst, rather than
the ￿ true￿trade-o⁄s that may possibly be retrieved from a positive model. See Dowrick
et al. (2003) for a method of retrieving such positive information. Furthermore, the
speci￿c ￿gure stated in the main text relates to the analysts￿trade-o⁄ as it results from
our proposed framework in the extreme universal agreement case. Lind (2004) spells out
























Figure 1: Partial comparability between di⁄erent dimensions in case of benchmarking.
Figure 1 illustrates the dispute. We put GDP per capita on the horizontal
and life expectancy on the vertical axis. There are three zones: zone A
presents all combinations of life expectancy and GDP per capita where,
even with disagreement about the exact trade-o⁄s to be used, the former
still contributes more to overall human development. We have the reverse
situation in zone C. In zone B there is disagreement: according to some
benchmark combinations (implicit prices) GDP outweighs life expectancy,
while according to other benchmark combinations life expectancy outweighs
GDP.
For later reference, we point out that such disagreement may still lead to
one country dominating another country in the generalized Lorenz sense. To
see this, note that for a country ￿ ￿nding itself in the disagreement zone the
formal implication is that s￿
Life years ￿ s￿
GDP=capita for some benchmarks
and s￿
GDP=capita ￿ s￿
Life years for some other vectors in Bp. (The same
may well be true for a country ￿). Now, as stated in section 2.1, checking








hki. In terms of these inequalities, disagreement
implies that there are several possibilities for ordering the normalized scores
on the left hand side (if it pertains to country ￿￿ s achievements) and/or on
the right hand side (if it pertains to country ￿￿ s achievements). To check
for dominance means checking whether the cumulative ordered sum totals
for country ￿ would not be lower (and at least once higher) than those of
country ￿. Such a scenario is certainly possible, not the least in the obvious
case where country ￿ outperforms ￿ in each (normalized) dimension (see e.g.,
10the next sections).9
The size of the disagreement zone crucially depends on p. If p = 0:5
both lines coincide and the disagreement zone B disappears. Decreasing p
increases zone B. In the end, one may set p = 0 for all dimensions, the value
that summarizes complete disagreement on the normalization issue. In that
case, we consider all values in between the minimal and maximal (sample)
score as plausible benchmarks for a speci￿c dimension.
9Conversely, agreement does evidently not guarantee dominance (i.e., the vector in-
equalities in proposition 1 may not hold even if there is agreement on the normalized
score vectors).
113 Robust outranking criteria
The dominance criterion of section 2.1. is based on pairwise country com-
parisons of (sums of) ordered normalized scores. The approach in section
2.2. essentially boils down to the statement that we allow for several pos-
sible scenarios regarding the magnitude, as well as the summation order, of
these normalized scores. We can now put the di⁄erent pieces of the puzzle
together. At this ￿nal stage, we explicitly need to de￿ne a decision rule that
takes the diversity of opinions into account. We will here de￿ne two domi-
nance criteria, a strong one and a weak one, and will subsequently indicate
how these can be implemented.
The strong criterion is inspired by Fleurbaey et al.￿ s (2004) generalized
Lorenz dominance criterion with bounded equivalence scales to compare
income distributions over households that di⁄er in needs. We here adapt
it to multi-dimensional comparisons of human development performances.
In words, we say that a country (generalized Lorenz) dominates another
country in a strongly robust sense if it does so for every possible normal-
ization (while the former country does not dominate the latter country for
some normalization). By a ￿ possible normalization￿we mean a normaliza-
tion that builds on benchmark vectors belonging to the set Bp. Intuitively,
this means that it will be harder for a country to outperform another one
as the disagreement about ￿ possible normalizations￿increases. Indeed, as
we have already stated in the introduction, one is likely to end up with
an incomplete ordering of countries. The same idea can be stated alterna-
tively as follows: as zones of disagreement get wider, a country￿ s raw data
rather than the analyst￿ s normative modelling options become increasingly
important in assessing that country￿ s relative position in the sample. This
is indeed a plausible way to think about the robustness problem.
We also consider a di⁄erent approach. The robustness issue is ultimately
rooted in the uncertainty surrounding the index￿construction options, as
re￿ ected by allowing for a set of di⁄erent normalizations. It is therefore
arguable whether the strong criterion itself is convincing in all cases. For
instance, while one country might not dominate another one for every pos-
sible normalization, it might do so for a subset of those normalizations,
without a similar but reverse relationship holding. Carrying this reason-
ing to its extreme, we will thus also present a weak variant, which states
that a country dominates another in a weakly robust sense if it does so for
at least one possible normalization (while the opposite dominance relation-
ship does not occur). In contrast with the strong dominance criterion, the
12weak version looks for support rather than unanimity in terms of the bench-
mark selection/possible normalizations. We may regard this weak criterion
as conservative, in that it maintains dominance of the former country over
the latter as long as there exists at least one possible normalization that sup-
ports this conclusion. In a sense, it allows countries with a di⁄erent policy
mix, and thus an outstanding performance in one of the dimensions, to put
more weight on its best dimension in order to outperform other countries.
Note that one can also refer to the robustness concern here: if a country is
judged to have been outperformed on the basis of this weak criterion, it is
far more due to its (feeble) raw data rather than to the composite index￿ s
arti￿ciality.10
We ￿rst de￿ne the strong criterion. As introduced informally above, it
states that a country with score vector x strongly dominates another country
with score vector y if and only if (1) x is at least as good as y according to
all (mutually agreed) benchmarks (in Bp, with 0 ￿ p ￿ 1
2) and all indices (in
I) and (2) not the other way around, or, there exists at least one benchmark
and one index such that x is strictly better than y. We get:




￿ y, if and only if
(1)
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Notice again that decreasing p increases the benchmark vector set and makes
the criterion more robust, but at the cost of completeness. More precisely,
for all p;q with 0 ￿ p ￿ q ￿ 1
2, and for all x;y 2 Rn
++ we have x ￿
p
￿
y ) x ￿
q
￿ y. In the end, ￿0
￿ is equal to the unanimity criterion: a country
dominates another country if and only if the former dominates the latter in
each dimension separately.
The strong dominance criterion ￿
p
￿ can be implemented via linear pro-
gramming techniques, verifying generalized Lorenz dominance (see proposi-
tion 1) for the ￿ least favorable￿benchmark selection. De￿ne Sj (J) as the set
containing all subsets K ￿ J with cardinality j. We get (the case for (2)
p
￿
10This weak version is inspired by Cherchye et al. (2004). Speci￿cally, focussing on
a linear aggregation index, these authors suggest the endogenous selection of the most


























































































This can be implemented as follows:













￿ (y;x) > 0, with
"
p

















Formally, the weak ￿ conservative￿dominance criterion states that a coun-
try with score vector x weakly dominates another country with vector y if
and only if there exists a benchmark (in Bp, with 0 ￿ p ￿ 1
2) such that x is
at least as good as y for all indices (in I) and (ii) not the other way around,
or there exists, for each benchmark at least one index such that x is strictly
better than y. We get:
definition 3: x weakly dominates y for some p, 0 ￿ p ￿ 1
2, denoted
x ￿p y, if and only if
(1)





























Notice that weak dominance extends strong dominance, i.e., for some given
p, 0 ￿ p ￿ 1
2 and for all x;y 2 Rn
++ we have x ￿
p
￿ y ) x ￿p y. But
weak dominance might also introduce cycles, i.e., a sequence of countries
14x1;x2;:::;xk such that x1 ￿p x2 ￿p ::: ￿p xk ￿p x1. Finally given p;q
with 0 ￿ p ￿ q ￿ 1
2, there is no relation between ￿p and ￿q anymore.
Attractively, the weak dominance can also be implemented via linear
programming techniques, but here verifying generalized Lorenz dominance
for the ￿ most favorable￿ benchmark. De￿ne ￿(J), the set containing all


















































































































with an equality sign for at least one permutation ￿ 2 ￿(J). This can be
implemented as follows:
proposition 3: x weakly dominates y for some p, 0 ￿ p ￿ 1
2, denoted
x ￿p y, i⁄
(1)
p "p (x;y) ￿ 0 and (2)
p "p (y;x) < 0, with
"p (x;y) = min
￿2￿(J)
min
b2Bp ￿ subject to











154 An illustrative application to UN 2002 data
As stated in the introduction, the media are eager to focus on the HDI-
country rankings on the release of a new HDR. Media headlines (and o¢ cial
press releases as well) often have a clear hit-parade ￿ avor (￿For the ￿fth
year in a row, Norway leads￿ , ￿Niger displaced Sierra Leone at the bot-
tom￿ , ￿the Netherlands: down seven places!￿ ,...). But to what extent do
such hit-parades hinge on the speci￿c modelling options? Are some coun-
tries ￿ mistreated￿ , in the sense that their ranking relative to other coutries
would be reversed conditional upon a change in such modelling options? As
stated above, these kinds of questions have been the subject of considerable
research. In this section, we will use the tools developed above to investigate
the extent to which country comparisons can still be made if one embeds
modelling uncertainty from the very beginning. Our application uses the
2002 UN-dataset, which contains the life expectancy at birth (in years), the
educational achievement (in %) ￿ a weighted average of the adult literacy
rate (% with weight 2/3) and the gross school enrolment rate (% with weight
1/3)￿ and the adjusted gross domestic product per capita (in PPP US$)
for 176 countries.11
Recall that our check for consistency with generalized Lorenz dominance
(i.e., with a class of indices) implies that we will not produce an index
number as such. What we can produce, using this general test, are pairwise
dominance results: a country may outperform another one, or the reverse, or
there is no robust dominance relation between the two countries considered.
Rather than overwhelming the reader with huge dominance tables, in the
next subsection we will explore the robustness of the HDI ranking for two
speci￿c groups of countries, namely 24 OECD and 45 sub-Saharan African
countries.12 A descriptive analysis of the pairwise dominance relationships
within these two country groups, which for the most part are situated at the
two extremes of the UN HDI rankings, should provide some ￿rst insight into
the robustness of the HDI. The second subsection looks at the full sample
of 176 countries. There we complement the former descriptive analysis by
statistical tests of the HDI￿ s robustness. We will be concerned with two
11These data are downloadable at http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/.
12Some summary information about dominance for the complete sample is provided in
the appendix. Speci￿cally, for the (extreme) criteria ￿
0
￿ and ￿
0 we there tabulate for
each country the number of observations that are (robustly) dominated by that country
and the number of observations that are dominating the country. In addition, we rank
the countries for each criterion on the basis of a net dominance metric, i.e., the number
of dominated observations minus the number of dominating observations.
16types of robustness assessment. First, we will address robustness of the
HDI country ranking itself. Second, we will take a broader view and ask
whether the HDI￿ s classi￿cation of countries (into low, middle and high
human development classes) is robust. In both subsections we use the strong
and weak dominance criteria, and we capture disagreement by considering
p = 1=4 (which corresponds to the inter-quartile range as the benchmark
set).13
4.1 Weakly and strongly robust dominance: OECD and sub-
Saharan Africa
We start with the OECD countries. Table 1 shows the strong pairwise domi-
nance relationships and Table 2 the weak relationships (according to ￿
1=4
￿ and
￿1=4) for 24 OECD countries. A ￿ 1￿means that the corresponding row coun-
try dominates the column country, while a ￿ 0￿means that the corresponding
row and column countries cannot be compared.
[Insert tables 1 and 2]
Notice that countries are ranked according to the HDI (from highest =1 to
lowest = 24). Thus, whenever we ￿nd (in tables 1 and 2) a ￿ 1￿below the
diagonal, we have a ￿ rank reversal￿ , i.e., a country with a worse HDI rank
which, using our robust method, dominates a country with a better HDI
rank. Whenever we ￿nd a ￿ 0￿above the diagonal, we have a ￿ disputable
ranking￿ , i.e., a country with a worse HDI rank that, given the perspective
we uphold, cannot be compared to a country with a better HDI rank. From
inspection of the tables, rank reversals do not occur. However, many ￿ dis-
putable HDI rankings￿exist: almost 75% of all possible pairwise comparisons
for the strong criterion. To recall, this means that if there is disagreement
about the appropriate normalization benchmark, three out of four times
there is either no (generalized Lorenz) dominance relation between the two
countries, or the ￿nding that country ￿ outperforms country ￿ may be re-
versed, conditional upon which normalization benchmark (taken from Bp)
is actually used. Such disputable rankings occur in 50% of the cases for the
weak criterion. Or stated verbally: we seek at least one possible normal-
ization for which country ￿ (generalized Lorenz) dominates ￿ while at the
13Recall from our discussion in section 2.2 that p = 1=2 and p = 0 correspond to
the extreme scenarios of, respectively, full agreement and full disagreement regarding the
appropriate benchmark choice. We choose to focus on the intermediate scenario p = 1=4
given the mainly illustrative purpose of this application.
17same time the reverse relation does not hold, but in half of the cases this
normalization cannot be found. Moreover, a large part (i.e., 25%) of the
remaining ￿ undisputable￿cases is essentially trivial, as they would also pass
the unanimity test ( i.e., the dominating country achieves a higher score in
each separate dimension). Thus, if we disregard the uncontroversial unanim-
ity rankings, none of the HDI rankings are robust according to the strong
dominance criterion ￿
1=4
￿ , while only 25% is considered robust when using
the weak version.14
There is also another sense in which the HDI￿ s complete ranking (i.e., its
￿ hit-parade nature￿ ) can be questioned. If we zoom in on the strong crite-
rion, some countries never dominate another country (Ireland, Luxembourg,
Italy, Greece and the Republic of Korea), while others are never dominated
by another country (Norway, Sweden, Australia, Canada, the Netherlands,
Iceland, Japan, Switzerland and Luxembourg). Notice that one of the OECD
countries is developed ￿ by default￿ . More precisely, Luxembourg never dom-
inates another country (due to its low school enrollment rate), but is never
dominated (due to its high GDP per capita). Other countries ￿ the United
States, Japan and Ireland￿ are ￿ almost￿developed ￿ by default￿(dominated
by at most one country and dominating at most one country), but for dif-
ferent reasons. More speci￿cally, while the United States and Ireland attain
a high GDP per capita, but a moderate life expectancy and school perfor-
mance, Japan achieves a high life expectancy and a poor school performance.
Diverging circumstances or policy choices may lead to more unequal
(normalized) scores. In contrast to the HDI, our methodology is sensitive to
inequality and thus puts such a less balanced development at a disadvantage.
Now, let us focus on the weak criterion. Using this ￿ conservative￿crite-
rion, we retain only a single country (Republic of Korea) that never dom-
inates another country, while some other countries (Norway, Sweden, Aus-
tralia and Luxembourg) are never dominated. Also note that the Republic
of Korea is now dominated by all other countries. Recall that the weak cri-
terion is much more ￿ exible compared to the strong one: it allows countries
to put more weight on their best achievement over the di⁄erent dimensions.
Therefore, the United States, Ireland and Japan are able to dominate other
countries (and are dominated by others). Only Luxembourg remains (al-
most) developed ￿ by default￿ .
Finally, we look at the 45 sub-Saharan African countries in our sample.
In tables 3 and 4 we report the dominance tables for ￿
1=4
￿ and ￿1=4. These
14Recalling our discussion in section 3, this means that for the OECD countries the
dominance table according to ￿
1=4
￿ corresponds with the unanimity ranking based on ￿
0
￿.
18countries are again ranked according to the HDI (from highest =1 to lowest
= 45).
[Insert tables 3 and 4]
Again no rank reversals occur for the strong criterion, but now there are 81
rank reversals for the weak criterion. Let us zoom in on the extreme cases,
viz. countries dominating other countries which are nonetheless ranked at
least 10 positions higher according to the HDI (for the subgroup of sub-
Saharan African countries). Although Guinea has a worse school perfor-
mance, it is able to dominate Congo, because the weak criterion allows it
to pick out one speci￿c normalization so as to put su¢ cient weight on its
best achievement (relative to Congo), namely its GDP per capita ￿gure.
Apparently, the opposite relationship does not hold, i.e., Congo cannot put
su¢ cient weight on its best achievement (relative to Guinea) to outperform
Guinea. The same mechanism (via a relatively high GDP per capita) allows
(i) Angola to dominate both Madagascar and Nigeria and (ii) Cote d￿ Ivoire
to dominate Madagascar.
Although we ￿nd some rank reversals (according to the weak dominance
criterion), there are less disputable rankings in this subset, i.e., fewer coun-
tries that are ranked by the HDI but which turn out to be non-comparable
once disagreement has been introduced. More precisely, about 59% and 97%
of all pairwise comparisons are considered robust by respectively the strong
and the weak dominance criterion. But again, we should remark that 21%
of all pairwise comparisons are due to unanimity. Thus, disregarding the
uncontroverial unanimity rankings leaves us with 38% of all comparisons
that are robust according to our strong criterion, while 75.6% are robust in
terms of the weak criterion.
Finally, using the strong dominance criterion, the Seychelles are never
dominated, while at the other end, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger never dom-
inate another country. Even stronger, the Seychelles succeed in dominating
all other countries, while Niger is dominated by all other countries. Moving
to the weak criterion, the Seychelles again are never dominated ￿ as they
dominate all other countries￿ while Niger never dominates another country
￿ as it is dominated by all other countries.
4.2 Statistical robustness analysis of the HDI
The above results for the OECD and sub-Saharan African subsamples demon-
strate the usefulness of our method in descriptively assessing the robustness
19of pairwise dominance relationships. As a general conclusion, we may state
that they question the robustness of the HDI as a ranking tool. Indeed, for
both subsamples we obtain the result that a large part of the HDI coun-
try dominance relationships do not appear to be robust with respect to the
strong outranking criterion; and a similar conclusion, albeit to a somewhat
lesser extent, applies for the (more conservative) weak criterion. We now
complement this descriptive assessment by a statistical investigation, which
considers the full sample of 176 countries.
Before presenting the statistical results, we start with some general ob-
servations that allow for a rough assessment of the robustness of the HDI
ranking. Obviously, the HDI ranking is complete and thus allows us to rank
100% of all possible pairwise country comparisons. Table 5 decomposes this
percentage of pairwise comparisons into robust comparisons and non-robust
comparisons (in columns), using the ￿
1=4
￿ and ￿1=4 dominance criteria (in
rows) to check robustness.
robust due to non-robust due to
unanimity non-unanimity non-comparability rank reversals
￿
1=4
￿ 69.66% 4.39% 25.94% 0.01%
￿
1=4 69.66% 23.44% 1.70% 5.19%
Table 5: decomposition of the HDI ranking into robust and non-robust
comparisons.
The explanation of the table is as follows. If we focus on the strong cri-
terion ￿
1=4
￿ , the percentage of robust comparisons is about 74% (= 69.66%
+ 4.39%). Still, the bulk of these pairwise dominance relationships (namely,
69.66%) is due to unanimity, i.e., a country which dominates another coun-
try by a higher (normalized) score in each dimension. Non-robust compar-
isons are mainly due to rankings which are judged non-comparable according
to ￿
1=4
￿ , rather than rank reversals. More precisely, only two rank reversals
took place: South-Africa (resp. Indonesia) is more developed than Tajikistan
(resp. Equatorial Guinea) according to ￿
1=4
￿ , while Tajikistan (resp. Equa-
torial Guinea) has a higher HDI rank.15 Using the weak criterion ￿1=4, the
picture is very di⁄erent. 93.1% of all pairwise comparisons are robust and a
signi￿cant part (23.44%) is not due to unanimity. Thus, there are possible
15Actually, the rank reversal of Equatorial Guinea is quite probably due to a data
problem: the UN reports a (tenfold?) high GDP ￿gure for this country and also uses it
in its calculation of the HDI rank.
20normalizations that corroborate the HDI ranking. This is mirrored by a
serious decline in the number of non-decisive rankings (only 1.70%). How-
ever, one also observes somewhat more rank reversals (5.19%). To conclude,
if we disregard the unanimity part ￿ which are basically non-controversial
rankings￿ the weak criterion seems to con￿rm the HDI ranking, while the
strong criterion clearly disagrees with the HDI in the sense that it considers
a signi￿cant part of countries as mutually incomparable.
We next want to obtain a more precise ￿ statistical￿statement regarding
the robustness of the HDI ranking, as well as of the UNDP￿ s concomittant
classi￿cation of the countries in human development groups. We proceed
as follows. On the basis of the HDI ranking, the United Nations arranges
countries into three groups, ranging from low over middle to high human
development. We employ ￿2 goodness-of-￿t tests to investigate the extent to
which the distribution of the robust dominance relationship over the di⁄erent
classes complies with the expected distribution under the null hypothesis
that the HDI ranking/classi￿cation is e⁄ectively robust.
Table 6 presents the results for the HDI country classi￿cation using the
strong dominance criterion ￿
1=4
￿ . The second column (with label ￿ #￿ ) con-
tains the number of countries in each human development class. In the
following columns, each cell ij (row i and column j) presents the number of
times a country ranked by the UN in class i dominates a country ranked in
class j; this number is expressed as a percentage of the maximum number of
pairwise comparisons possible (for classes i and j). Moving from the lower
left to the upper right corner, the percentages increase. This stands to rea-
son: countries with a higher (lower) value for the original HDI ranking are
more likely to dominate (to be dominated by) others.
j
i
# 1 2 3
1 55 51.11 84.78 100.00
2 86 0.00 48.04 90.44
3 36 0.00 0.00 36.67
with diagonals: ￿
2 = 1732.18 (p = 0.000)
without diagonals: ￿
2 = 137.90 (p = 0.000)
Table 6: Comparing ￿
1=4
￿ and the United Nations￿human development
classi￿cation.
If the HDI ranking were a fully robust tool for ranking individual countries,
then all cells on and above the diagonal in Table 6 would value 100 percent.
21Hence, the ￿2 tests that include the diagonal values in the table can be
conceived as a (weak) check for robustness of the HDI country ranking.
Next, robustness of the HDI classi￿cation only requires 100 percent in the
cells above the diagonal, whence the robustness of this classi￿cation can be
checked by excluding the diagonal values in the ￿2 tests.
Table 6 reports values that are rather far below 100 percent, not only
on the diagonal (even as low as 36.67%) but also above the diagonal (as
low as 84.04%). The ￿2 tests con￿rm this impression. When including
the diagonal entries, we strongly reject the hypothesis that the HDI is a
robust ranking tool. When excluding the diagonal cells, which means that
we consider robustness of the HDI classi￿cation, the test statistic decreases
sharply, but the value remains far from reasonably probable under the null
hypothesis of a strongly robust HDI classi￿cation.
This ￿rst assessment casts serious doubt on the robustness of the HDI￿ s
results. Yet, it is based on the rather stringent dominance criterion ￿
1=4
￿ ,
and may be conceived as too harsh. Table 7 uses the milder criterion ￿1=4
as a base of comparison.
j
i
# 1 2 3
1 55 87.81 99.22 100.00
2 86 0.76 99.53 98.61
3 36 0.00 0.94 91.75
with diagonals: ￿
2 = 27.32 (p = 0.000)
without diagonals: ￿
2 = 0.89 (p = 0.642)
Table 7: Comparing ￿1=4 and the United Nations￿human development
classi￿cation.
Notice that the percentages on and above the diagonal are now much closer
to 100%. The results of the ￿2 tests are mixed: while they reject robustness
of the HDI ranking (see the results that include the diagonal values), they
support robustness of the HDI classi￿cation (see the results that exclude the
diagonals).
Tables 6 and 7 partly con￿rm the rough picture sketched in table 5. Us-
ing the strong dominance criterion ￿
1=4
￿ to test the robustness of both the
HDI country ranking and the country classi￿cation leads to rejection. How-
ever, the weak dominance criterion ￿1=4 is milder: although the complete
22HDI ranking is not robust, at least as a classi￿cation device it can stand
the robustness test. Therefore, as a main conclusion, we may state that
our analysis suggests that the (incomplete) HDI classi￿cation is reasonably
robust, while the opposite holds for the (complete) HDI country ranking.16
16Of course, the above ￿ndings are contingent on the speci￿c disagreement level we
have started from. Thus, it is certainly worth mentioning that our (weak) robustness test
cannot reject robustness of the HDI ranking on the basis of the weak criterion ￿
0.
235 Conclusion
We have presented a robust approach to rank alternatives (e.g., di⁄erent
countries), when there are multiple relevant performance dimensions (e.g.,
the di⁄erent dimensions of human development). First, we suggested a for-
mal normalization procedure that seeks to express the usual controversies
associated with this step in composite indicator bilding. Basically, this is
achieved by incorporating a wide range of transformation possibilities, each
associated with an alternative benchmark performance selection. Second,
we proposed a generalized Lorenz dominance criterion for aggregating the
di⁄erent performance dimensions, which e⁄ectively obtains a ranking crite-
rion that is consistent with the whole class of increasing, S-concave indices.
Third, we proposed a weak as well as a strong dominance criterion, based on
the previous normalization/aggregation step. Both versions can be imple-
mented via linear programming, which is convenient from a practical point
of view.
Our assessment of the Human Development Index illustrates the prac-
tical usefulness of the procedure. In particular, our application has focused
on testing the robustness of (i) the United Nations￿HDI itself as a tool
for ranking individual countries and (ii) the corresponding country classi￿-
cation, which is based on the HDI, into low, middle or high development.
We found that the HDI classi￿cation (i.e., essentially an incomplete country
ranking) may be conceived as reasonably robust, while the opposite holds
for the (complete) HDI ranking. Speci￿cally, we have shown that there are
many cases in which the HDI country ranking may be called ￿ disputable￿ ,
which means that two countries turn out to be incomparable or are sub-
ject to a rank reversal when accounting for disagreement regarding the ap-
propriate evaluation scheme. In fact, such disputable rankings are mainly
situated ￿ within￿the HDI classes rather than ￿ between￿countries of di⁄er-
ent classes, which explains the more favorable testing results for the HDI
classi￿cation. Of course these ￿ndings can be criticized, in that our nor-
malization/aggregation methodology and the one actually used by UNDP
are quite di⁄erent. For example, the fact remains that we have used GDP
per capita, whereas the HDI is (not uncontroversially) built on its logged
value. Note however that this is at least partly neutralized by the very fact
that we allow for a broad range of implicit trade-o⁄ values. The same holds
for the aggregation procedure we proposed: it admittedly cannot produce
HDI-like index numbers, but the rationale of this ￿ shortcoming￿is precisely
that we want to check several possible indices simultaneously. Finally, and
more importantly, even if our results with regard to the HDI are deemed
24only partially substantive, our application still makes the general demonstra-
tion that the proposed methodology may be instrumental for a descriptive
as well as a statistical robustness investigation of existing country rank-
ings/classi￿cations when multiple performance dimensions are relevant.
An interesting avenue for further research consists in endogenously de￿n-
ing a classi￿cation of countries on the basis of the (weakly or strongly) robust
outranking criteria as they have been de￿ned in this study. Speci￿cally, this
would boil down to conceiving a country classi￿cation such that each country
in a higher class (resp. weakly or strongly) robustly dominates each coun-
try in a lower class, while the opposite never occurs. Such an endogenous
classi￿cation exercise is similar in spirit to Noorbakhsh￿ s (1988). Another
interesting question is whether the gap between strong and weak dominance
￿ between ￿ all￿and ￿ at least one￿allowable normalization(s) supporting a
country￿ can be ￿lled, e.g., by using a criterion that tells us what percent-
age of all possible normalizations favours one country over another.
Appendix
For the criteria ￿0
￿ (see ￿strong dominance￿ ) and ￿0(see ￿weak dominance￿ )
we tabulate, for each individual country, the number of observations that
is (robustly) dominated by that country and the number of observations
that is dominating the country. We rank the countries for each criterion on
the basis of a ￿net dominance￿metric, which is calculated as the number
of dominated minus the number of dominating observations.We stress the
illustrative nature of these summarizing results; other ranking procedures
are equally possible. Given the speci￿c orientation of the current paper,
our main focus is on the pairwise dominance relationships. More detailed
(country-speci￿c) pairwise dominance information is given in Tables 1-4;










1 Australia 162 0 162
2 Norway 161 0 161
3 Canada 159 0 159
4 Belgium 159 1 158
5 Sweden 157 0 157
6 Netherlands 155 0 155
7 Iceland 153 0 153
8 United Kingdom 151 2 149
8 Austria 151 2 149
10 Switzerland 148 0 148
10 France 151 3 148
10 New Zealand 151 3 148
10 Spain 150 2 148
14 Finland 149 2 147
15 Denmark 147 1 146
16 United States 145 1 144
17 Ireland 144 1 143
18 Japan 142 0 142
19 Germany 144 8 136
20 Luxembourg 131 0 131
20 Israel 137 6 131
22 Italy 138 8 130
23 Portugal 139 10 129
24 Greece 136 13 123
25 Slovenia 138 16 122
26 Korea, Rep. of 133 13 120
27 Barbados 132 13 119
28 Singapore 127 15 112
29 Argentina 124 19 105
30 Hong Kong, China (SAR) 100 1 99
30 Poland 119 20 99
32 Cyprus 116 18 98
33 Czech Republic 120 25 95
34 Estonia 101 9 92
35 Malta 106 15 91
36 Lithuania 108 21 87
36 Uruguay 112 25 87
38 Chile 109 27 82
39 Slovakia 109 29 80
40 Brunei Darussalam 101 23 78
40 Saint Kitts and Nevis 88 10 78
42 Croatia 107 30 77
43 Hungary 99 23 76
44 Seychelles 101 26 75
45 Costa Rica 93 22 71
46 Latvia 94 26 68
47 Cuba 82 24 58
48 Bahrain 87 30 57
49 Qatar 74 23 51
50 Bulgaria 84 34 50
51 Kuwait 76 27 49
52 Belarus 73 27 46
53 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 83 40 43
53 Macedonia, TFYR 80 37 43
55 Mexico 78 39 39
55 Trinidad and Tobago 79 40 39
57 Panama 74 36 38
58 United Arab Emirates 58 21 37
59 Albania 73 37 36
2660 Ukraine 68 33 35
62 Russian Federation 61 27 34
62 Saint Lucia 72 38 34
64 Malaysia 72 39 33
64 Suriname 74 41 33
66 Bahamas 59 28 31
67 Bosnia and Herzegovina 69 39 30
68 Tonga 62 34 28
69 Venezuela 68 41 27
70 Mauritius 66 40 26
70 Romania 68 42 26
70 Jamaica 60 34 26
73 Samoa (Western) 66 43 23
74 Armenia 58 36 22
75 Colombia 67 46 21
76 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 60 41 19
77 Kazakhstan 54 36 18
78 Turkmenistan 54 37 17
79 Azerbaijan 57 41 16
80 Brazil 57 42 15
80 Philippines 62 47 15
80 Maldives 55 40 15
83 Lebanon 61 47 14
84 Oman 49 37 12
84 Thailand 61 49 12
86 Saudi Arabia 49 38 11
86 Dominica 58 47 11
86 Georgia 48 37 11
89 Jordan 60 53 7
90 Turkey 62 56 6
90 Tunisia 53 47 6
92 Fiji 59 54 5
92 Paraguay 61 56 5
94 Peru 60 56 4
95 Sri Lanka 56 53 3
96 Belize 56 55 1
96 Iran, Islamic Rep. of 56 55 1
96 Occupied Palestinian Territories 48 47 1
99 China 60 60 0
100 Grenada 52 53 -1
101 Guyana 48 50 -2
102 Ecuador 56 59 -3
103 Dominican Republic 54 58 -4
103 Uzbekistan 33 37 -4
105 Kyrgyzstan 30 38 -8
106 El Salvador 54 65 -11
107 Syrian Arab Republic 50 63 -13
108 Cape Verde 54 69 -15
109 South Africa 27 45 -18
110 Bolivia 47 67 -20
111 Algeria 47 69 -22
112 Mongolia 33 56 -23
113 Tajikistan 16 43 -27
114 Gabon 34 67 -33
115 Viet Nam 46 80 -34
116 Moldova, Rep. of 26 62 -36
117 Indonesia 49 86 -37
118 Botswana 12 56 -44
119 Honduras 45 91 -46
120 Nicaragua 44 91 -47
27121 Namibia 16 69 -53
122 Egypt 36 90 -54
123 Guatemala 39 97 -58
124 Sao Tome and Principe 24 83 -59
125 Morocco 28 91 -63
126 Equatorial Guinea 23 95 -72
127 Solomon Islands 24 100 -76
128 India 29 107 -78
129 Vanuatu 13 96 -83
130 Cambodia 28 112 -84
130 Ghana 29 113 -84
132 Swaziland 2 92 -90
133 Papua New Guinea 22 114 -92
134 Lao People's Dem.  Rep. 22 116 -94
134 Zimbabwe 1 95 -94
136 Myanmar 16 113 -97
136 Lesotho 2 99 -97
138 Comoros 19 117 -98
139 Bhutan 16 116 -100
140 Sudan 17 120 -103
141 Cameroon 14 118 -104
142 Bangladesh 13 118 -105
143 Uganda 12 118 -106
144 Kenya 8 115 -107
145 Nepal 12 122 -110
145 Togo 12 122 -110
145 Congo 9 119 -110
148 Pakistan 7 118 -111
148 Mauritania 8 119 -111
150 Djibouti 10 123 -113
151 Haiti 12 126 -114
152 Yemen 5 124 -119
152 Guinea 3 122 -119
154 Nigeria 6 126 -120
154 Gambia 7 127 -120
156 Madagascar 4 126 -122
157 Timor-Leste 0 124 -124
158 Angola 0 125 -125
159 Benin 6 132 -126
160 Eritrea 5 132 -127
160 Rwanda 2 129 -127
162 Senegal 4 132 -128
162 Malawi 1 129 -128
164 Zambia 0 130 -130
165 Côte d'Ivoire 4 135 -131
166 Tanzania, U. Rep. of 1 134 -133
167 Central African Republic 1 142 -141
168 Congo, Dem. Rep. of the 2 144 -142
168 Mozambique 1 143 -142
170 Chad 1 144 -143
171 Mali 1 145 -144
171 Burkina Faso 0 144 -144
173 Ethiopia 2 150 -148
174 Burundi 1 151 -150
175 Niger 0 151 -151
176 Guinea-Bissau 0 155 -155










1 Luxembourg 176 0 176
2 Norway 175 1 174
3 Ireland 173 2 171
4 United States 172 3 169
5 Denmark 172 4 168
6 Canada 171 5 166
7 Iceland 170 6 164
8 Switzerland 168 7 161
9 Netherlands 168 8 160
10 Australia 167 9 158
11 Austria 166 10 156
12 Belgium 165 11 154
13 Sweden 164 12 152
14 Japan 162 13 149
15 France 162 14 148
16 United Kingdom 161 15 146
17 Finland 160 16 144
18 Germany 159 17 142
19 Italy 157 18 139
20 Hong Kong, China (SAR) 157 19 138
21 Singapore 156 20 136
22 New Zealand 155 21 134
23 Spain 154 22 132
24 Israel 153 23 130
25 Greece 152 24 128
26 Slovenia 151 25 126
27 Portugal 150 26 124
28 Cyprus 149 27 122
29 Brunei Darussalam 148 28 120
30 United Arab Emirates 147 29 118
31 Korea, Rep. of 146 30 116
32 Malta 145 31 114
33 Qatar 144 32 112
34 Seychelles 143 33 110
35 Barbados 142 33 109
36 Czech Republic 140 35 105
37 Bahrain 140 36 104
38 Bahamas 139 37 102
39 Kuwait 138 38 100
40 Hungary 137 39 98
41 Estonia 136 40 96
42 Slovakia 135 41 94
43 Saint Kitts and Nevis 134 42 92
44 Argentina 132 43 89
44 Poland 132 43 89
46 Lithuania 129 45 84
46 Oman 130 46 84
48 Chile 128 47 81
48 Croatia 128 47 81
50 Antigua and Barbuda 127 49 78
51 Saudi Arabia 126 50 76
52 Latvia 125 51 74
53 Mauritius 124 52 72
54 Costa Rica 123 53 70
55 Trinidad and Tobago 122 53 69
56 Mexico 120 55 65
57 Uruguay 119 56 63
58 Malaysia 119 57 62
59 Russian Federation 118 58 60
60 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 117 59 58
2961 Brazil 116 60 56
62 Bulgaria 115 61 54
63 Tonga 114 62 52
64 Thailand 113 62 51
65 Macedonia, TFYR 111 64 47
66 Suriname 111 65 46
67 South Africa 110 66 44
68 Romania 109 67 42
69 Grenada 107 68 39
70 Panama 107 69 38
71 Bosnia and Herzegovina 105 71 34
71 Colombia 104 70 34
73 Belarus 103 72 31
74 Cuba 103 73 30
74 Dominican Republic 102 72 30
76 Tunisia 101 75 26
77 Kazakhstan 100 76 24
78 Turkey 99 77 22
79 Iran, Islamic Rep. of 98 78 20
80 Samoa (Western) 97 79 18
81 Venezuela 96 80 16
82 Saint Lucia 95 81 14
83 Fiji 94 82 12
84 Belize 93 83 10
85 Ukraine 91 84 7
86 Albania 91 85 6
87 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 89 87 2
87 Dominica 88 86 2
89 Peru 88 88 0
90 Maldives 87 89 -2
91 Algeria 86 90 -4
92 Paraguay 85 91 -6
93 China 83 91 -8
94 Gabon 83 93 -10
95 Lebanon 82 94 -12
96 Cape Verde 80 93 -13
97 Turkmenistan 81 95 -14
98 Philippines 78 96 -18
98 El Salvador 79 97 -18
100 Jordan 77 99 -22
101 Botswana 76 100 -24
102 Jamaica 75 101 -26
103 Guyana 74 102 -28
104 Namibia 73 103 -30
105 Sri Lanka 72 104 -32
106 Armenia 70 104 -34
106 Ecuador 71 105 -34
108 Azerbaijan 69 107 -38
109 Syrian Arab Republic 68 108 -40
110 Guatemala 67 109 -42
111 Indonesia 65 110 -45
112 Egypt 65 111 -46
113 Georgia 64 112 -48
114 Occupied Palestinian Territories 63 113 -50
115 Morocco 62 114 -52
116 Bolivia 61 115 -54
117 Honduras 60 116 -56
118 Viet Nam 59 117 -58
119 Nicaragua 57 118 -61
120 Swaziland 57 119 -62
30121 Equatorial Guinea 56 120 -64
122 Uzbekistan 54 121 -67
122 Kyrgyzstan 54 121 -67
124 India 53 122 -69
125 Mongolia 52 124 -72
126 Moldova, Rep. of 51 125 -74
127 Vanuatu 50 126 -76
128 Ghana 49 127 -78
129 Cambodia 48 128 -80
130 Solomon Islands 47 129 -82
131 Papua New Guinea 46 130 -84
132 Sao Tome and Principe 45 131 -86
133 Lesotho 44 132 -88
134 Zimbabwe 43 133 -90
135 Cameroon 41 135 -94
136 Tajikistan 39 134 -95
137 Lao People's Dem.  Rep. 40 136 -96
138 Bhutan 39 136 -97
139 Comoros 38 137 -99
140 Sudan 37 138 -101
141 Pakistan 35 139 -104
141 Mauritania 36 140 -104
143 Bangladesh 34 142 -108
144 Djibouti 33 143 -110
145 Togo 32 144 -112
146 Uganda 31 145 -114
147 Myanmar 30 146 -116
148 Haiti 29 147 -118
149 Nepal 28 148 -120
150 Guinea 27 148 -121
151 Gambia 26 150 -124
152 Kenya 25 151 -126
153 Congo 24 152 -128
154 Angola 22 152 -130
155 Senegal 22 154 -132
156 Rwanda 21 155 -134
157 Côte d'Ivoire 20 156 -136
158 Nigeria 19 157 -138
159 Yemen 18 158 -140
160 Benin 17 159 -142
161 Madagascar 16 160 -144
162 Eritrea 15 161 -146
163 Central African Republic 14 162 -148
164 Chad 13 163 -150
165 Zambia 12 163 -151
166 Mozambique 11 165 -154
167 Tanzania, U. Rep. of 10 166 -156
168 Timor-Leste 9 167 -158
169 Malawi 8 168 -160
170 Ethiopia 7 169 -162
171 Congo, Dem. Rep. of the 6 170 -164
172 Burundi 4 169 -165
173 Guinea-Bissau 5 171 -166
174 Mali 3 173 -170
175 Burkina Faso 2 174 -172
176 Sierra Leone 1 175 -174
177 Niger 0 176 -176
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331234567891 01 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 92 02 12 22 32 4
1 norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0100010110101111
2 Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000000001010111
3 Australia 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0001100101101111
4 Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000010100111111
5 Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000000000100111
6 Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0001100001101111
7 Iceland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000000000101100
8 United States 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000000000000001
9 Japan 00000000 000000000001000
10 Ireland 000000000 00000000000000
11 Switzerland 000000000 0 0000000101100
12 United Kingdom 000000000 0 0 000000000011
13 Finland 000000000 0 0 0 00000000011
14 Austria 000000000 0 0 0 0 0000100100
15 Luxembourg 000000000 0 0 0 0 0 000000000
16 France 000000000 0 0 0 0 0 0 00001100
17 Denmark 000000000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000011
18 New Zealand 000000000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000111
19 Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000000000 00100
20 Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000000000 0101
21 Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000000000000 000
22 Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000000000000 00
23 Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000000000000 1
24 Korea, Rep. of 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000000000000000
Table 1: strong dominance relations for OECD subsample; interquartile range as
benchmark range (0 = row element does not dominate column element; 1 = row
element dominates column element)
341234567891 01 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 92 02 12 22 32 4
1 norway 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1111110111111111
2 Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0001100001111111
3 Australia 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1001100101111111
4 Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1000110100111111
5 Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1000110100111111
6 Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1001100101111111
7 Iceland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000010100101111
8 United States 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000000000001111
9 Japan 00000000 000000100111111
10 Ireland 000000000 00000000001011
11 Switzerland 000000000 0 0000000101111
12 United Kingdom 000000000 0 0 100000011111
13 Finland 000000000 0 0 0 00000011111
14 Austria 000000000 0 0 0 0 0000101111
15 Luxembourg 000000000 0 0 0 0 0 000000001
16 France 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000000 00101111
17 Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000000 0101111
18 New Zealand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000000000 010111
19 Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000000000 01111
20 Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000000000 0111
21 Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000000000000 001
22 Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000000000000 11
23 Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000000000000 1
24 Korea, Rep. of 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000000000000000
Table 2: weak dominance relations for OECD subsample; interquartile range as
benchmark range (0 = row element does not dominate column element; 1 = row
element dominates column element)
351 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
1 Seychelles 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1111111111111111111111111111111111111
2 Mauritius 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1111111111111111111111111111111111111
3 Cape Verde 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0111111111111111111111111111111111111
4 Equatorial Guinea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000010111111111111111111111111111111
5 South Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1001010111111111111111111111111111111
6 Gabon 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0001111111111111111111111111111111111
7 Săo Tomé and Principe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000000100011100101011011011111111111
8 Namibia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0001000110111101111111111111111111111
9 Botswana 00000000 001000110111100101011111111111111111
10 Ghana 000000000 00111101011101111111111111111111111
11 Comoros 000000000 0 0000000000001110010111011111111111
12 Swaziland 000000000 0 0 000000001100100001011001010111111
13 Sudan 000000000 0 0 0 00000000001110010111011111111111
14 Cameroon 000000000 0 0 0 0 0000000101111011111011111111111
15 Togo 000000000 0 0 0 0 0 000001100101011011011111111111
16 Congo 000000000 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000000000001011001010111011
17 Lesotho 000000000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000000000001011001010111111
18 Uganda 000000000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000000001001011011111111111
19 Zimbabwe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000000000 00000000000011001000111111
20 Kenya 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000000000 0000000001011011010111011
21 Madagascar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000000000000 000000000001001000110001
22 Nigeria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000000000000 00000000011001010110011
23 Mauritania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000000000000 0110100000101010111111
24 Gambia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000000000000000 010000000000010111111
25 Eritrea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000000000000000 00000000000010110011
26 Senegal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000000000000000 0000000000010101111
27 Rwanda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000000000000000000 000011001001011111
28 Guinea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000000000000000000 00000000010111111
29 Benin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000000000000000000 0000010010111011
30 Tanzania, U. Rep. of 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000000000000000000000 001000000000001
31 Côte d'Ivoire 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000000000000000000000 00001111111111
32 Zambia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000000000000000000000 0000000000010
33 Malawi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000000000000000000000000 000000000001
34 Angola 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000000000000000000000000 00010111111
35 Chad 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000000000000000000000000 0010101011
36 Congo, Dem. Rep. of the 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000000000000000000000000000 000010001
37 Central African Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000000000000000000000000000 00001111
38 Ethiopia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000000000000000000000000000 0100001
39 Mozambique 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000000000000000000000000000000 001011
40 Guinea-Bissau 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000000000000000000000000000000 00001
41 Burundi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000000000000000000000000000000 0001
42 Mali 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000000000000000000000000000000000 010
43 Burkina Faso 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000000000000000000000000000000000 00
44 Niger 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000000000000000000000000000000000 0
45 Sierra Leone 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000000000000000000000000000000000000
Table 3: strong dominance relations for Subsaharan African subsample;
interquartile range as benchmark range (0 = row element does not dominate
column element; 1 = row element dominates column element)
361 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
1 Seychelles 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1111111111111111111111111111111111111
2 Mauritius 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1111111111111111111111111111111111111
3 Cape Verde 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1111111111111111111111111111111111111
4 Equatorial Guinea 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0110111111111111111111111111111111111
5 South Africa 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1111111111111111111111111111111111111
6 Gabon 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1111111111111111111111111111111111111
7 Săo Tomé and Principe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0010110111111111111111111111111111111
8 Namibia 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0111111111111111111111111111111111111
9 Botswana 00010011 111111111111111111111111111111111111
10 Ghana 000000100 10111111111111111111111111111111111
11 Comoros 000000000 0 0101101011111111111111111111111111
12 Swaziland 000100100 1 1 111111111111111111111111111111111
13 Sudan 000000000 0 0 0 01101011111111111111111111111111
14 Cameroon 000000000 0 1 0 1 1101011111111111111111111111111
15 Togo 000000000 0 0 0 0 0 101011101111111111111111111111
16 Congo 000000000 0 0 0 0 0 0 00001100110011011111111111111
17 Lesotho 000000000 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1111111111111111111111111111
18 Uganda 000000000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 011101111111111111111111111
19 Zimbabwe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0010111101 11111111111111111111111111
20 Kenya 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000000000 1100110011011111111111111
21 Madagascar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000000000000 000000001001001000111111
22 Nigeria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000000000001 00000001011001010111111
23 Mauritania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000011010111 1111111111111111111111
24 Gambia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000000010001110 111011111111111111111
25 Eritrea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000000000000000 00001011001010111111
26 Senegal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000000000011001 1011111011111111111
27 Rwanda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000000000000110010 011111011111111111
28 Guinea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000000100011101111 11111111111111111
29 Benin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000000000000001000 1011011111111111
30 Tanzania, U. Rep. of 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000000000000000000000 001000000001111
31 Côte d'Ivoire 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000000000001100100011 11011111111111
32 Zambia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000000000000000000010 1001010111111
33 Malawi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000000000000000000000000 000000001111
34 Angola 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000000000001100111011111 11111111111
35 Chad 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000000000000000000010110 1010111111
36 Congo, Dem. Rep. of the 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000000000000000000000000000 000011111
37 Central African Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000000000000000000001011011 11111111
38 Ethiopia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000000000000000000000000000 0111111
39 Mozambique 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000000000000000000000000100101 111111
40 Guinea-Bissau 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000000000000000000000000000000 11111
41 Burundi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000000000000000000000000000000 1111
42 Mali 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000000000000000000000000000000000 111
43 Burkina Faso 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000000000000000000000000000000000 11
44 Niger 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000000000000000000000000000000000 0
45 Sierra Leone 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000000000000000000000000000000000001
Table 4: weak dominance relations for Subsaharan African subsample;
interquartile range as benchmark range (0 = row element does not dominate
column element; 1 = row element dominates column element)
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